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Appellate Practice and Procedure
by Roland F. L. Hall*
and David R. Cook Jr."
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys decisions addressing appellate law and procedure
handed down by the Georgia Supreme Court and the Georgia Court of
Appeals between June 1, 2010 and May 31, 2011.1 The cases discussed
fall into the following categories: (1) appellate jurisdiction; (2) preserving the record; and (3) miscellaneous cases of interest.
II.
A.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Selecting the Correct Appeal Procedure

In Noaha, LLC v. Vista Antiques & PersianRugs, Inc.,2 the Georgia
Court of Appeals addressed the proper means of appealing the domestication of a foreign judgment.' The court of appeals considered whether,
pursuant to section 5-6-35(aX8) of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated

* Partner in the law firm of Autry, Horton & Cole, Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer University
(B.A., magna cum laude, 1991); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D.,
magna cum laude, 1994). Member, Mercer Law Review (1992-1994); Senior Managing
Editor (1993-1994). Member, State Bars of Georgia and Florida.
** Partner in the law firm of Autry, Horton & Cole, Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer
University (B.B.A., 2001); Georgia College and State University (M.S. in Accounting, 2002);
Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 2005). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
1. For analysis of Georgia appellate practice and procedure law during the prior survey
period, see Roland F. L. Hall, Appellate Practiceand Procedure,Annual Survey of Georgia
Law, 62 MERCER L. REV. 25 (2010).
2. 306 Ga. App. 323, 702 S.E.2d 660 (2010).
3. Id. at 326, 702 S.E.2d at 662.
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(O.C.G.A.), 4 an appellant pursuing such an appeal must use the
discretionary appeal procedure.s
The plaintiff in Noaha obtained a judgment against the defendant
from the Court of Common Pleas for Richland County, South Carolina,
based on the defendant's breach of their settlement agreement. Under
the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Law,' the plaintiff
moved the State Court of DeKalb County to domesticate the South
Carolina judgment.' The trial court domesticated the judgment, and a
writ of fieri facias was issued thereon. In the interim, an appeal from
the South Carolina judgment was brought, and the Georgia trial court
stayed the execution of the domesticated judgment pending such appeal.
When the South Carolina court issued a final revised judgment, the
Georgia trial court lifted the stay and amended the prior judgment to
conform to the revised South Carolina judgment. From the revised
judgment, the defendant filed a direct appeal.'
The plaintiff moved for the Georgia Court of Appeals to dismiss the
appeal on the basis that a direct appeal was improper."o The plaintiff
maintained that the proper method to attack a domesticated foreign
judgment is by a motion to set aside pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-1160(d)," and that the defendant's appeal was, in substance, "an appeal
of the denial of a motion to set aside." 2 The plaintiff argued that,
under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(8), the denial of such a motion is appealable
only by discretionary appeal. The defendant argued that O.C.G.A. § 5-635(a)(8) did not apply because the defendant had moved to vacate the
domestication order and opposed the lift of stay.'
The court of appeals concluded that, although the defendant moved to
vacate the domestication order, the true substance of the appeal was an
attack on the domesticated judgment." Thus, the court of appeals

4. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(aX8) (1995 & Supp. 2011).
5. Noaha, 306 Ga. App. at 325, 702 S.E.2d at 662.
6. Id. at 323-24, 702 S.E.2d at 661.
7. O.C.G.A. §§ 9-12-130 to -138 (2006).
8. Noaha, 306 Ga. App. at 323, 702 S.E.2d at 661.
9. Id. at 324-25, 702 S.E.2d at 661-62.
10. Id. at 325, 702 S.E.2d at 662.
11. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(d) (2006).
12. Noaha, 306 Ga. App. at 325, 702 S.E.2d at 662.
13. Id. at 325-26, 702 S.E.2d at 662-63.
14. Id. at 326, 702 S.E.2d at 663 (quoting Rebich v. Miles, 264 Ga. 467, 468-69, 448
S.E.2d 192, 194 (1994)) ("[TIhe underlying subject matter generally controls over the relief
sought in determining the proper procedure to follow to appeal.").
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dismissed the appeal based on its conclusion that the defendant should
have filed for a discretionary appeal rather than filing a direct appeal.15
In Avren v. Garten,16 the Georgia Supreme Court considered the
scope of supersedeas arising from a notice of appeal and application for
discretionary appeal." In this postdivorce litigation between a former
wife and husband, the trial court found the former wife "in contempt of
previous court orders," denied her other requests for relief, and "ordered
[her] to pay the outstanding balance due the guardian ad litem
appointed to represent the parties' minor son."" While the trial court
considered the former husband's request for attorney fees, the former
wife filed a notice of appeal and an application for discretionary review.
Five days later, the trial court granted the former husband's request for
attorney fees. The trial court then denied the former wife's motion for
reconsideration. The supreme court granted her application for
discretionary review of such denial.19
The supreme court inquired whether the trial court's denial of the
former wife's motion to set aside the award of attorney fees was directly
appealable or was subject to a discretionary appeal.2 o The court
considered two statutory bases: (1) O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(11), 2 1 which
authorizes a direct appeal from "[aill judgments or orders in child
custody cases including, but not limited to, awarding or refusing to
change child custody or holding or declining to hold persons in contempt
of such child custody judgment or orders," 22 and (2) O.C.G.A. § 5-635(a)(8), which requires an application for discretionary review to appeal
the denial of a motion to set aside.2 3
Resolving the apparent inconsistency, the supreme court held that the
former wife was required to file an application for discretionary
review.24 The court relied upon Rebich v. Miles,2 5 which held that,
where the appeal invokes both O.C.G.A. §§ 5-6-34(a)2 6 and 5-6-35(a),"

15. Id.
16. 289 Ga. 186, 710 S.E.2d 130 (2011).
17. Id. at 189, 710 S.E.2d at 136.
18. Id. at 186, 710 S.E.2d at 133.
19. Id. at 189, 710 S.E.2d at 136.
20. Id. at 192, 710 S.E.2d at 137.
21. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(11) (Supp. 2011).
22. Id.
23. Avren, 289 Ga. at 192, 710 S.E.2d at 137; see also O.C.G.A.
24. Avren, 289 Ga. at 192, 710 S.E.2d at 137.
25. 264 Ga. 467, 468, 448 S.E.2d 192, 194 (1994).
26. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a) (1995 & Supp. 2011).

27. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a) (1995 & Supp. 2011).

§ 5-6-35(a)(8).
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an application for appeal is required." Therefore, the inconsistency
was resolved in favor of filing an application for appeal.29
In Alston & Bird LLP v. Mellon Ventures II, L.P , the court of
appeals considered whether an appellant could directly appeal a trial
court's review of a special master's findings. In this legal malpractice
action arising from a soured investment deal, "[t]he trial court ...
appointed a special master to make reports and recommendations on
discovery disputes" and, subsequently, "issues of law and fact."32 The
trial court adopted the special master's recommendations, which
effectively invalidated many of the law firm's affirmative defenses, and
the law firm appealed. In addition, the trial court granted the plaintiffs'
motion for partial summary judgment and denied the law firm's motion
for partial summary judgment.3 3
The court of appeals first considered its jurisdiction over the appeal by
questioning whether the law firm should have filed an application for
discretionary appeal pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1), which applies
to appeals from trial court judgments in review of auditors' decisions.3 4
Alternatively, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(h)35 authorizes a direct appeal upon
the grant of summary judgment.
The court of appeals held that the law firm could bring a direct
appeal.3 1 It reasoned that O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1), which requires an
application for appeal, did not apply because it refers to appeals related
In this case, however, the trial court
to decisions of an auditor.
adopted the decision of a special master. In other words, because the
trial court adopted the decision of a special master, and not an auditor,
the court of appeals had jurisdiction without the necessity of an
application for discretionary appeal.40

28. Avren, 289 Ga. at 192, 710 S.E.2d at 137.
29. Id.
30. 307 Ga. App. 640, 706 S.E.2d 652 (2010).
31. Id. at 642, 706 S.E.2d at 656.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Alston & Bird LLP, 307 Ga. App. at 642, 706 S.E.2d at 656; O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1).
35. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(h) (2006).
36. Alston & Bird LLP, 307 Ga. App. at 642, 706 S.E.2d at 656; O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(h).
37. Alston & Bird LLP, 307 Ga. App. at 642, 706 S.E.2d at 656.
38. Id.; see also O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1).
39. Alston & Bird LLP, 307 Ga. App. at 642, 706 S.E.2d at 656. The trial court
appointed a special master under Uniform Superior Court Rule 46, which was adopted on
June 4, 2009. Id.; see also GA. UNIF. SUP. CT. R. 46.
40. Alston & Bird LLP, 307 Ga. App. at 642, 706 S.E.2d at 656.
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Jurisdictionover Equity Cases
Over the years, the merger of substantive principles of equity into
legal principles has caused much confusion concerning the Georgia
4
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over "[aill equity cases." ' The
court must, therefore, continually delineate its scope of jurisdiction over
equity cases. For example, in Reeves v. Newman,42 the supreme court
returned a case to the court of appeals because the court of appeals
erroneously concluded, on the basis of the relief sought in the complaint,
that the case was subject to the supreme court's exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over equity cases. 43
In Reeves, the plaintiffs, two sisters, sought to set aside deeds and
conveyances by their mother allegedly procured by two other sisters'
fraud, false pretenses, and undue influence. The jury found in favor of
the plaintiffs, and the trial court imposed an implied trust over the
property for the benefit of all sisters. All parties then appealed the
rulings to the court of appeals, yet none questioned the propriety of the
implied trust."
Because the trial court had imposed the equitable remedy of a
constructive trust, the court of appeals concluded that the matter was
subject to the supreme court's exclusive appellate jurisdiction over equity
cases. As a result, the court of appeals transferred the case to the
supreme court.4 5
The supreme court recognized that the first question arising as to the
cases transferred to it, as purported equity cases, was whether the case
was appropriately before the court.4 6 The determination of whether an
appeal is an "equity case" is based solely on the "issuels] raised on
In
appeal, not upon the kinds of relief sought in the complaint."
addition, where equitable relief is "merely ancillary to underlying issues
of law, or would have been a matter of routine once the underlying
issues were resolved," the matter is not an equity case.4 ' Finally, an
appeal not addressing "the propriety of . . . equitable relief granted or
B.

41. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 6, para. 3, cl. 2.
42. 287 Ga. 317, 695 S.E.2d 626 (2010).
43. Id. at 318-19, 695 S.E.2d at 627-28.
44. Id. at 317, 695 S.E.2d at 627.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 318, 675 S.E.2d at 627.
47. Id. (quoting Redfearn v. Huntcliff Homes Ass'n, 271 Ga. 745, 748, 524 S.E.2d 464,
467-68 (1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
48. Id. (quoting Beauchamp v. Knight, 261 Ga. 608, 609, 409 S.E.2d 208, 209 (1991))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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rejected" first belongs in front of the court of appeals, not the supreme
court.
Applying the foregoing precedent to this matter, the supreme court
recognized that neither party had identified any error concerning "the
propriety of the implied trust . . . ."" All issues raised on appeal were
questions of law, not equity." The supreme court made clear that
"[c] ontrary to the [c] ourt of [a] ppeals' analysis, the mere imposition of an
implied trust as an equitable remedy does not automatically trigger this
Court's jurisdiction. 5 2 Accordingly, the supreme court returned the
appeal to the court of appeals for disposition.
In Kemp v. Neal," the plaintiffs, the national African Methodist
Episcopal Church and its officials, brought an action to quiet title to
property on which the defendant local church held services. The
plaintiffs brought the action after members of the defendant local church
sought to terminate the local church's relationship with the plaintiffs.
The trial court held in favor of the plaintiffs and determined that the
defendant's possessory interest in the property was held in trust for the
benefit of the plaintiff national church. The trial court also ordered that
all property of the defendant local church be delivered to the plaintiffs
and that the name of the defendant be removed from all accounts. The
defendant brought a direct appeal from the trial court's order to the
supreme court.55
The supreme court inquired into the matter of jurisdiction sua
sponte." While the defendant based jurisdiction on the supreme court's
"jurisdiction over '[ci ases involving title to land,"' the supreme court held
that the appeal actually came within its jurisdiction over equity cases."
The supreme court held that the trial court granted equitable relief
when it ordered that the defendant's name be removed from all local
church accounts, that such accounts be delivered to the national church,
and that the national church "assume all indebtedness on any personal
property" of the local church.s The supreme court also held that

49.
S.E.2d
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
S.E.2d
57.
58.

Id. (quoting Warren v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 272 Ga. 142, 143, 527
563, 565 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 318-19, 675 S.E.2d at 627.
Id.
Id. at 319, 675 S.E.2d at 627-28.
Id. at 319, 675 S.E.2d at 628.
288 Ga. 324, 704 S.E.2d 175 (2010).
Id. at 324-25, 704 S.E.2d at 177.
Id. at 325, 704 S.E.2d at 178 (quoting In the Interest of KRS, 284 Ga. 853, 853, 672
622, 624 (2009)).
Id.; GA. CONST. art. VI, § 6, para. 3, cl. 1.
Kemp, 288 Ga. at 325, 704 S.E.2d at 178.
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determining "how the trial court should have molded the equitable relief
to protect" the local church required "examination of the trial court's
exercise of discretion and [thus] depend[ed] upon equitable considerThe court concluded that "[blecause resolution of the
ations."59
equitable issue raised here would not be a matter of routine once the
underlying legal issues are resolved ... a substantive issue on appeal
involves the legality or propriety of equitable relief," and thus the appeal
came within the "[clourt's jurisdiction over equity cases."o
Justice Benham dissented from the court's holding that the appeal fell
within the court's jurisdiction over all equity cases."1 Justice Benham
determined that the equitable relief awarded by the trial court "flow[ed]
directly from the legal determination that the national church ...
own[ed] the real and personal property" in the possession of the local
church." Justice Benham concluded that because the equitable relief
awarded routinely followed upon the trial court's legal determination,
there was "no question of the legality or propriety of equitable relief and
the case [was] not one in equity."' He stated in his dissent that the
court's approach "up-ends th[e clourt's 20-year effort. . . to delineate as
clearly as possible the scope of its jurisdiction over 'equity cases.'""
Justice Benham further stated that ,
[tihe majority's approach smudges the bright-line rule thle clourt has
been buffing to a sheen and enables a litigant to select the appellate
forum in which a case with equitable features is to be heard, a practice
th[e clourt rejected in Beauchamp v. Knight ... and in Krystal Co. v.
Carter."

Justice Benham concluded that because the equitable relief granted by
the trial court was "ancillary to the underlying legal issue" of which
church had "the right to control the local church property," the supreme
court's equity jurisdiction was not involved, and the case should have
been transferred to the court of appeals.

59. Id. at 326, 704 S.E.2d at 178.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 334, 704 S.E.2d at 183 (Benham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justices Thompson and Hines joined Justice Benham in his dissent to the
jurisdictional determination. Id. at 336, 704 S.E.2d at 185.
62. Id. at 335, 704 S.E.2d at 184.
63. Id. (quoting Lamar Cnty. v. E.T. Carlyle Co., 277 Ga. 690, 691,594 S.E.2d 335, 337
(2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
64. Id. (quoting Redfearn, 271 Ga. at 747, 524 S.E.2d at 466) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
65. Id.; see also Krystal Co. v. Carter, 256 Ga. 43, 43, 343 S.E.2d 490, 492 (1986);
Beauchamp, 261 Ga. at 609, 409 S.E.2d at 209-10.
66. Kemp, 288 Ga. at 335, 704 S.E.2d at 184.
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Miscellaneous JurisdictionalIssues
In Zinkhan v. Bruce,67 a paternal uncle was granted testamentary

guardianship of his deceased brother's children by the probate court
after the children's father murdered the mother and killed himself.
After the maternal uncle and aunt filed a petition for custody, the
superior court awarded joint legal custody to both the maternal uncle
and aunt and the paternal uncle. However, the superior court awarded
physical custody to the maternal uncle and aunt. The paternal uncle
appealed to the court of appeals on the basis that the superior court
lacked jurisdiction to consider the maternal uncle's petition in light of
the probate court's exclusive jurisdiction to appoint him as testamentary
guardian."
The court of appeals held that the probate court had exclusive
jurisdiction to issue letters of testamentary guardianship and that no
valid basis existed for the superior court to exercise jurisdiction and
consider the petition for custody. 9 The court rejected the argument
that the superior court had jurisdiction over the case as one in equity."o
The court held that equitable relief was not available because the
maternal uncle and aunt had an available legal remedy in the probate
court, in that they could petition for revocation or suspension of the
paternal uncle's letters of testamentary guardianship.7 1 If such petition
had been granted, the maternal uncle and aunt could have then "sought
further relief by filing a petition for permanent guardianship ....
As such, filing the custody action in superior court was simply an
improper and invalid attempt to collaterally attack the probate court's
The court of appeals reversed the
guardianship appointment.
superior court's custody order."
In Tavakolian v. Agio Corp.,5 the plaintiff property owner brought
suit to redeem property sold at a tax sale.7 ' The trial court entered
default judgment against the tax sale purchaser and summary judgment
against a subsequent transferee of the property.77 Upon the court of

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

305 Ga. App. 510, 699 S.E.2d 833 (2010).
Id. at 510-11, 699 S.E.2d at 834.
Id. at 511, 699 S.E.2d at 834.
Id. at 514, 699 S.E.2d at 837.
Id. at 514, 699 S.E.2d at 836-37.
Id. at 514, 699 S.E.2d at 836.
Id. at 514, 699 S.E.2d at 837.

74.

Id.

75.
76.
77.

309 Ga. App. 652, 711 S.E.2d 33 (2011).
See Tavakolian v. Agio Corp., 304 Ga. App. 660, 660, 697 S.E.2d 233, 235 (2010).
Tavakolian, 309 Ga. App. at 652, 711 S.E.2d at 34.
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appeals reversal of the summary judgment order as to the transferee,
the trial court conducted a hearing and entered judgment in favor of the
owner and against the transferee." The transferee appealed from the
judgment and "argue ld] that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter
final judgment . . . because the remittitur had not [yet] been issued.""
The court of appeals agreed. 0
The court of appeals determined that, after it denied the tax sale
purchaser's motion for reconsideration in the first appeal, the trial court
held the hearing and subsequently issued final judgment.8 ' However,
during this time, the tax sale purchaser filed a notice of intention to
apply to the supreme court for writ of certiorari; thus, the court of
appeals did not issue the remittitur to the trial court until after the
petition for certiorari was denied, by which time the judgment had
already been entered by the trial court.82 The property owner argued
that the fact the remittitur had not been issued did not affect jurisdiction because the remittitur was connected with the tax sale purchaser's
appeal, while the final judgment was connected to the transferee.'
The court of appeals rejected this novel argument, holding that the
judgment was a final order that affected both the tax sale purchaser and
the transferee and that the trial court had no power to enter judgment
in the absence of a remittitur.84
Generally, an appellant must file an application for discretionary
appeal within thirty days upon the entry of the order, decision, or
judgment to be reviewed.
When a motion for new trial is filed,
however, O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(d)86 extends the deadline until thirty days
after the trial court rules on the motion for new trial." In Cooper v.
Spotts,88 the court of appeals previously dismissed the appellant's
application for discretionary appeal because her motion for new trial was
pending before the trial court. In an attempt to secure jurisdiction
before the court of appeals, the appellant withdrew her motion for new
trial." The appellant relied on Department of Human Resources v.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 652-53, 711 S.E.2d at 34.
Id. at 653, 711 S.E.2d at 34.
Id.
Id. at 653, 711 S.E.2d at 34-35.
Id.
Id. at 653, 711 S.E.2d at 35.
Id.
See O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(d) (1995 & Supp. 2011).
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(d) (1995 & Supp. 2011).
Id.
309 Ga. App. 361, 710 S.E.2d 159 (2011).
Id. at 362, 710 S.E.2d at 160.
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Holland"o to argue that the trial court was without authority to rule on
the motion for new trial and that the court of appeals had jurisdiction
to review the application on the merits.91
Overruling Holland, the court of appeals held that the filing of the
motion for new trial did not divest the trial court of its authority to rule
on the motion for new trial." While, generally, the filing of an
application for discretionary appeal acts as a supersedeas," O.C.G.A.
§ 5-6-35(d) effectively delays the divesture of jurisdiction from the trial
court until it rules on a pending motion for new trial.94 Thus, the court
of appeals ruled that it should have dismissed the appellant's initial
application for discretionary appeal.s
The appellant's second application for discretionary appeal was filed
beyond the thirty-day period after the trial court's order but within
thirty days of her withdrawal of the motion for new trial.96 The court
of appeals held that the appellant's withdrawal of her motion for new
trial did not satisfy O.C.G.A. § 5-6-38,9' which requires that the trial
court rule on the motion for new trial.9" Accordingly, the appellant was
not entitled to the extension of time to file her application for discretionary appeal, and the application was dismissed.99
In Davis v. Davis,"oo a former wife brought an action against her
former husband, seeking to impose a constructive trust on her community property interest in his military retirement benefits. The former wife
also sought to domesticate the previously entered Louisiana divorce
decree. After the trial court dismissed the former wife's action, she filed
a notice of appeal to the court of appeals."o' The court of appeals
transferred the case to the supreme court on the basis of the supreme
court's "jurisdiction over all divorce and alimony cases and all equity
cases."l 02

90. 236 Ga. App. 273, 511 S.E.2d 628 (1999).
91. Cooper, 309 Ga. App. at 362, 710 S.E.2d at 160.
92. Id. at 364, 511 S.E.2d at 161.
93. O.C.G.A § 5-6-35(h) (1995 & Supp. 2011).
94. Cooper, 309 Ga. App. at 362, 710 S.E.2d at 159-60 (citing Housing Auth. of Atlanta
v. Geter, 252 Ga. 196, 197, 312 S.E.2d 309, 311 (1984)); see also O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(d).
95. Cooper, 309 Ga. App. at 364, 710 S.E.2d at 161.
96.

Id.

97. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-38 (1995).
98. Cooper, 309 Ga. App. at 364, 710 S.E.2d at 161 (quoting Heard v. State, 274 Ga.
196, 197, 552 S.E.2d 818, 821 (2001)); see also O.C.G.A. § 5-6-38.
99. Cooper, 309 Ga. App. at 364, 710 S.E.2d at 161.
100. 287 Ga. 897, 700 S.E.2d 404 (2010).
101. Id. at 897, 700 S.E.2d at 405.
102. Id. at 897-98, 700 S.E.2d at 405.
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The supreme court held that because the former wife's property rights
depended on property law, rather than upon the divorce decree, the case
was not a divorce and alimony case."o' The former wife's action did
not seek to have the trial court clarify the divorce decree but, rather,
sought resolution of issues not resolved by the Louisiana court that
granted the divorce.1 " Based on the underlying cause of action, "to
partition personal property in the form of retirement benefits," the
dispute was in fact a property dispute."os The supreme court further
held that the mere fact that the complaint sought to domesticate the
divorce decree did not make the case a divorce or alimony case.10
The supreme court also held that the case did not fall within its equity
jurisdiction.' 7 While the court of appeals stated in its transfer order
that the supreme court had described a constructive trust as "a remedial
device created by a court of equity to prevent unjust enrichment," the
supreme court held that where "the issues raised on appeal are legal in
nature and do not relate to the propriety of the constructive trust itself,
appellate jurisdiction lies in the [clourt of [a]ppeals."os The supreme
court further held that "an action to partition personal property is
generally not an equity case."109 Concluding that the action was not
a divorce and alimony case, nor an equity case, and that no other basis
supported its jurisdiction, the supreme court returned the appeal to the
court of appeals.'
III.

PRESERVING THE RECORD

In Anthony v. Gator Cochran Construction, Inc.," the supreme court
cleared up confusion created by two court of appeals cases regarding the
preservation of error from inconsistent verdict forms.112 The supreme
court held that an appellant's failure to object to an allegedly inconsistent special verdict form did not waive such error on appeal." in so
ruling, the prior holdings of the court of appeals in BrannanAuto Parts

103.
104.
S.E.2d
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 898, 700 S.E.2d at 405-06.
Id. at 898, 700 S.E.2d at 406 (quoting Barolia v. Pirani, 260 Ga. App. 513, 514,580
297, 299 (2003)).
Id.
Id. (quoting Lewis v. Robinson, 254 Ga. 378, 378, 329 S.E.2d 498, 499 (1985)).
Id.
Id. at 898-99, 700 S.E.2d at 406 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 899, 700 S.E.2d at 406.
Id.
288 Ga. 79, 702 S.E.2d 139 (2010).
Id. at 79, 702 S.E.2d at 140.
See id. at 80, 702 S.E.2d at 140-41.
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v. Raymark Industry"' and Ford Motor Co. v. Tippins" were expressly overruled by the supreme court. 116
In Anthony, when the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff,
the defendants appealed, arguing that the special verdict form was
inconsistent. While the court of appeals recognized that judgments
based on inconsistent verdicts are void, it nevertheless affirmed the trial
court because the defendants failed to object to the special verdict form.
The court of appeals relied on an exception it previously set forth in
Brannan Auto Parts, which provides that the failure to object to a
special verdict form will result in waiver of the error on appeal if the
inconsistency is evident from the face of the form."'
The supreme court concluded that this exception resulted from the
court of appeals misreading the supreme court's holding in Frostgate
Warehouses, Inc. v. Cole,"' in which the supreme court did not address
Accordingly, the supreme court
inconsistent or void verdicts."'
expressly overruled the court of appeals holding in Brannan Auto
Parts.'20
Similarly, the court of appeals relied on Ford Motor Co. for the rule
that the failure to object to an inconsistent verdict upon its return will
result in waiver of such error on appeal.12 ' Expressly overruling Ford
Motor Co., the supreme court held that if the verdict form is inconsistent, the resulting judgment must be set aside, notwithstanding a party's
failure to object.1 22 Further, a party's failure to object does not result
in waiver of the erroneous verdict form on appeal.' 2 3
In Heard v. City of Villa Rica,'2 4 a negligence action was brought on
behalf of a minor against a city and a volunteer coach for the city's
recreation department. The minor sought damages for injuries he
sustained in a training session held by the volunteer coach.' 2 5 The
defendants argued that the claims against the coach were barred by

114.
S.E.2d
115.
S.E.2d
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

183 Ga. App. 82, 357 S.E.2d 807 (1987), overruled by Anthony, 288 Ga. at 80, 702
at 141.
225 Ga. App. 128, 483 S.E.2d 121 (1997), overruledby Anthony, 288 Ga. at 80, 702
at 141..
Anthony, 288 Ga. at 80, 702 S.E.2d at 141.
Id. at 79-80, 702 S.E.2d at 140-41.
244 Ga. 782, 262 S.E.2d 98 (1979).
Anthony, 288 Ga. at 79-80, 702 S.E.2d at 140.
Id. at 80, 702 S.E.2d at 141.
Id.
Id.
Id.
306 Ga. App. 291, 701 S.E.2d 915 (2010).
Id. at 291, 701 S.E.2d at 916.
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O.C.G.A. § 51-1-41,121 which provides limited immunity from suit for
volunteer coaches. 12 7 The plaintiff argued that the exception to
immunity in O.C.G.A. § 51-1-41 applied because the injury was caused
by grossly negligent conduct on the part of the coach. The trial court
found that the gross negligence exception did not apply, that the coach
was immune from suit, and therefore granted summary judgment to the
defendants.'2 8
On appeal, the plaintiff raised, for the first time, the argument that
O.C.G.A. § 51-1-41 did not apply because the coach "was not 'officiating'
an 'athletic contest"' as provided in the statute.129 The plaintiff relied
on prior cases in which the court of appeals allowed arguments to be
raised for the first time on appeal. 3 o The cases relied upon by the
plaintiff included McCombs v. Synthes' 3 in which the supreme court
held that a finding on the newly raised "issue was implicit in the trial
court's order."' 32 However, the court of appeals distinguished McCombs on the basis that, in the instant case, the plaintiff and the trial
court both assumed that O.C.G.A. § 51-1-41 applied to the defendant
The court of appeals also relied on the fact that the plaintiff
coach.'
had affirmatively acknowledged that O.C.G.A. § 51-1-41 applied and
then argued that the case fell within the gross negligence exception.3 4
The court of appeals also found that "it would be unfair to force [the
defendants] to respond to [the] belated argument and address this issue
for the first time 'within the narrow time frame of appellate practice
rules.'" 35
IV.

MISCELLANEOUS CASES OF INTEREST

3 the Georgia Supreme Court granted certioraIn Propst v. Morgan,"
ri to determine whether the court of appeals committed error in
considering the merits of the defendant's "motion to recuse the trial
judge before considering whether the trial judge properly dismissed [the
defendant's] appeal of the final judgment" due to unreasonable delay in

126. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-41 (2000).
127. Heard, 306 Ga. App. at 291, 701 S.E.2d at 916-17; see also O.C.G.A. § 51-1-41.
128. Heard, 306 Ga. App. at 291, 701 S.E.2d at 916-17.
129. Id. at 293, 701 S.E.2d at 918; see also O.C.G.A. § 51-1-41.
130. Heard, 306 Ga. App. at 293, 701 S.E.2d at 918.
131. 277 Ga. 252, 587 S.E.2d 594 (2003).
132. Heard, 306 Ga. App. at 293 n.5, 701 S.E.2d at 918 n.5.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 293, 701 S.E.2d at 918.
135. Id. at 294, 701 S.E.2d at 918 (quoting Pfeiffer v. Ga. Dep't of Transp., 275 Ga. 827,
829, 573 S.E.2d 389, 391 (2002)).
136. 288 Ga. 862, 708 S.E.2d 291 (2011).
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transmitting the record to the court of appeals."' The trial court
denied the defendant's motion to recuse the trial judge, and the
defendant declined to pursue an interlocutory appeal. The jury
subsequently returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. After the
defendant filed a notice of appeal, the trial court dismissed the appeal
on the basis of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-48(c)," which allows a trial court to
dismiss an appeal due to unreasonable delay in transmission of the
record to the appellate court.13 1
On appeal, the plaintiff argued 'that the court of appeals could only
reach the merits of the recusal motion if it concluded "that the trial court
erred in dismissing the appeal."l 40 Rejecting this argument, the court
of appeals held that the trial court should have assigned the motion for
recusal to another judge for decision.141
The supreme court noted that under established case law, "an
appellate court typically will not address the merits of the case before
deciding whether the trial court properly dismissed the appeal,"
pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-48(c).142 The supreme court also noted that
another line of decisions held that if, after a motion for recusal, "it is
later determined that the judge should have been disqualified[, then] ...
all proceedings after the filing of the motion to recuse are 'invalid
. . ,1143 The supreme court stated that "[h]aving considered these two
lines of cases, we conclude the merits of a party's recusal motion against
the trial judge must be an exception to the general rule" that the merits
of an appeal should not be addressed before deciding whether the appeal
was properly dismissed under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-48(c).144 The supreme
court concluded that "[ilt would undermine the integrity of the judicial
process to insulate the recusal issue from review and to treat as
legitimate the dismissal of an appeal by a judge who should be
disqualified based on a proper consideration of a recusal motion."' 4 5
Thus, the supreme court affirmed the judgment.'46

137. Id. at 862-63, 708 S.E.2d at 292-93.
138. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-48(c) (1995 & Supp. 2011).
139. Propst, 288 Ga. at 862-63, 708 S.E.2d at 292-93; see also O.C.G.A. § 5-6-48(c).
140. Propst, 288 Ga. at 863, 708 S.E.2d at 293.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 864, 708 S.E.2d at 293 (quoting Gillis v. City of Waycross, 247 Ga. App. 119,
122, 543 S.E.2d 423, 426 (2000)).
144. Id. at 864, 708 S.E.2d at 294.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 865, 708 S.E.2d at 294.
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In In re N.A. U.E. ,17 a father whose parental rights were terminated
filed an application for discretionary appeal in the court of appeals,
The father contended that
challenging the termination order."'
49
a parent to file a discretionrequires
which
§
5-6-35(a)(12),'
O.C.G.A.
parental rights, violated
terminating
order
an
ary application to appeal
the father's applicatransferred
appeals
of
court
due process.'o The
the supreme court
and
question,
constitutional
the
tion on the basis of
granted the application to decide whether O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(12),
which took effect in 2008, did in fact violate due process.-"' The
supreme court made short work of the constitutional argument. The
court relied on well-established case law that if a "trial on the merits is
provided," a state is not required to provide appellate review'" and
noted that discretionary appeals may be provided even in criminal
cases.1 53
To seek an interlocutory appeal, an appellant must obtain a certificate
of immediate review from the trial court judge who issued the order to
In Mauer v. Parker Fibernet, LLC,"' the
be reviewed on appeal.'
court of appeals dismissed an appeal because the appellant failed to
When the original trial court transferred
satisfy this requirement.'
the case to another court with proper venue, the appellant requested a
certificate from the transferee court instead of the transferor court that
The court of appeals held that
had issued the removal order.'
"[blecause the certificate was not signed by the trial judge who issued
the removal order," the certificate was invalid under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(b)
and did not provide a basis for the court of appeals to exercise jurisdiction over the appeal.'s The court of appeals noted that, although
O.C.G.A. § 9-10-53159 provides that upon transfer, all further proceedings are to "be conducted as if the case had been originally commenced
in the [transferee] court,"' 60 O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(b) contains a more
147. 287 Ga. 797, 700 S.E.2d 393 (2010).
148. Id. at 797, 700 S.E.2d at 393.
149. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(12) (Supp. 2011).
150. In re N.A.U.E., 287 Ga. at 797,700 S.E.2d at 393; see also O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(12).
151. In re N.A. U.E., 287 Ga. at 797, 700 S.E.2d at 393-94.
152. Id. at 797, 700 S.E.2d at 394 (quoting Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 77 (1972))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
153. Id.
154. See O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(b) (1995 & Supp. 2011).
155. 306 Ga. App. 160, 701 S.E.2d 599 (2010).
156. Id. at 160-61, 701 S.E.2d at 600.
157. Id. at 161, 701 S.E.2d at 601.
158. Id. at 162, 701 S.E.2d at 602.
159. O.C.G.A. § 9-10-53 (2007).
160. Id.
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specific rule governing the requirements for the certificate of immediate
review."' Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded that the appellant "failed to follow the interlocutory procedures" and dismissed the
appeal. 162

161.
162.

Mauer, 306 Ga. App. at 162-63, 701 S.E.2d at 602; see also O.C.G.A.
Mauer, 306 Ga. App. at 163, 701 S.E.2d at 602.

§ 5-6-34(b).

